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ABSTRACT. Should the law punish the mere utterance of lies even if the listener
has not been deceived? Seana Shiffrin has recently answered this question in the
affirmative. She argues that pure lying as such harms the moral fabric of sincerity
and distorts the testimonial warrants which underpin communication. The article
begins with a discussion of Shiffrin’s account of lying as a moral wrong and the
idea of impersonal harm to moral goods. Then I raise two objections to her
theory. First, it does not explain persuasively why the fabric of sincerity is so
vulnerable to pure lying. Second, it underestimates the need for a causal link
between the alleged harm and the speech the government suppresses. I explore the
function of the causal inquiry in constitutional law and suggest that if Shiffrin’s
theory were to become the standard for adjudication in freedom of expression
cases, protection for speech would deteriorate.
I. LYING AS A WRONG
Lying, Seana Shiffrin explains in Speech Matters,1 is a moral and legal
wrong.2 In her view, a lie ‘is an assertion that the speaker knows she
does not believe, but nevertheless deliberately asserts, in a context
that, objectively interpreted, represents that assertion as to be taken
by the listener as true and as believed by the speaker.’3 Such asser-
tions interfere with the possibility of expressing our genuine mental
contents and accessing the mental contents of others, which, in turn,
is necessary for our development as moral agents. Therefore, there is
*City, University of London. An earlier version of the article was presented at a conference at
University College London. I am grateful to members of the audience, and to an anonymous reviewer
for Law and Philosophy, for comments and suggestions.
1 Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Speech Matters: On Lying, Morality and the Law (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2014) (hereafter: Shiffrin, Speech).
2 Shiffrin, Speech 162.
3 Shiffrin, Speech 116. See also the discussion in pages 12-16.
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a ‘moral presumption of truthfulness in communication’ which
encompasses ‘a requirement of sincerity, namely that one believe
what one says when one solemnly affirms it, as well as a requirement
to exert some effort to be accurate about what one says.’4
This is a view of sincerity which requires that the assertion be a
genuine representation of the speaker’s mental content; where there
is a discrepancy between the two, the communication is a lie. The
same concern is reflected in R.M. Hare’s definition of insincerity as
‘not saying what one really thinks’.5 Thus, the essence of sincerity is
taken to be truthfulness, and speech must correspond to the
speaker’s thoughts to qualify as truthful.6 For Shiffrin, truthful
speech in that sense is the means to address ‘our mutual epistemic
limitations and the complexity of the environment in which we find
ourselves’.7 By communicating our thoughts and accessing the
thoughts of others we engage in a learning process about ourselves
and them, about our political community and the wider world, and
about the requirements of morality. We learn what it means to be
human, and to live as one, in a complex world. Therefore, we value
truthful speech and, as we will see later, we expect the law to offer it
a very robust protection because it is the epistemic medium for
accessing others’ genuine mental content, which is a prerequisite for
thinking about the human condition.
Further, Shiffrin argues that the speaker’s intent to deceive or the
likelihood of his utterance deceiving the listener are not prerequisites
for lying: ‘a lie does not depend upon its recipient being deceived or
upon its issuer intending to deceive the recipient.’8 It is enough that
the speaker is falsifying the contents of her mind when communi-
cating them to another person. In speech contexts, such falsification
is a lie even if the speaker does not intend to affect the beliefs of her
listeners or knows that her utterance will not be believed by them.
This definition of a lie is important for Shiffrin’s explanation of the
wrongness of lying. She argues that it ‘inhere[s] in the production
4 Shiffrin, Speech 11.
5 R.M. Hare, Freedom and Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963) 83.
6 A different account of sincerity as an exclusion of contrary thoughts in relation to the subject about
which the speaker is making an utterance is developed in Stuart Hampshire, ‘‘Sincerity and Single-
Mindedness’’ in Freedom of Mind and Other Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972) 232. This is not
an issue for Shiffrin who focuses on the correspondence between thought and speech.
7 Shiffrin, Speech 9.
8 Shiffrin, Speech 13. On the differences between lies and deceptions see the discussion in pages 19-21.
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and expression of a lie’.9 Lying is morally wrong qua lying—irre-
spective of the liar’s intent or the effect of his falsehoods on the
audience—because it spoils the possibility of relying on others’
communicative utterances as a means of accessing their minds. Since
testimony is the only way of knowing what others think, it needs to
be preserved as a mechanism for the expression of truth. Lying turns
it into a mechanism ‘for conveying both the false and the true.’10
But, then, we cannot be certain that what we are being told is a
genuine representation of the speaker’s thoughts; the presumption of
truthfulness no longer works. Using speech to convey falsehoods
‘eliminate[s] a fail-proof, trustworthy mode of access to one another.
Because there are no external methods of verification—no means by
which others may peer into one’s mind—to lie is to sully the one
road of authoritative access to oneself and thereby cut oneself off
from community with others. Doing so frustrates achievement of
the compulsory moral ends associated with mutual understanding
and cooperation.’11
II. IMPERSONAL HARM
The fact that lying is morally wrong is not a sufficient condition for
making it a legal wrong too. We wouldn’t think that the government
is justified in punishing every moral wrong, nor would we find the
prospect of living under such a regime attractive. Something more is
required before our moral failures can legitimately become the
business of the state. A usual candidate is harm: where a moral
wrong causes harm to another or, in some cases, to oneself, the
government may have reason to act. Shiffrin follows this path. She
argues that lying can be harmful in different ways and this justifies
legal regulation. Sometimes there will be competing reasons against
curtailing falsehood. The example she discusses in detail is that of
autobiographical lies which do not deceive the listener.12 Her view is
that we should refrain from punishing the liar because such an
attitude ‘conveys a compassionate acknowledgement of our shared,
flawed humanity and the message that we are willing to continue on
9 Shiffrin, Speech 19.
10 Shiffrin, Speech 23.
11 Shiffrin, Speech 23.
12 Shiffrin, Speech chapter 5.
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together despite our predictable failures.’13 Yet, the underlying ra-
tionale is not speech but ‘equality, fraternity and toleration’.14 Put
differently, speech does not provide a reason which can override the
governmental interest in suppressing lies.
This conclusion is linked to Shiffrin’s account of the harm caused
by lying. Clearly speech in general can cause harm15 and false speech
in particular is often the subject of state regulation through civil or
criminal law. A classic case is the protection of an individual’s rep-
utation from harm caused by false allegations. Other examples in-
clude perjury, false statements to the police and fraudulent
misrepresentation. What those cases have in common is that lying
causes a specific harm, to a person or a legitimate state objective
such as solving a crime, which is a fact that is reason for govern-
mental regulation.
For Shiffrin, such specific ‘legally cognizable harm’16 is not a
necessary condition for the exercise of state coercion. Even if the lie
is not directed to a particular individual and the liar is not trying to
gain material advantage for himself the government can legitimately
hold him legally responsible because his lying harms ‘the culture of
trust’.17 She argues:
‘[D]eliberately false speech does damage to our collective testimonial framework by giving us
reasons to doubt that a person’s word is reliable as such and that somber testimonial speech
provides us with warrants to take what is offered as representing what is believed. That is,
deliberately insincere speech does collective harm by ambiguating signals that function well only
when fairly clear, signals whose preservation and use are crucial for sustaining a functioning
moral and political culture.’18
Thus, lying qua lying is not only a moral wrong but becomes a legal
wrong too because it harms a cultural presumption that the
speaker’s words are a true reflection of his mental content. The
government does not need to point to a specific victim; the victim is
the moral fabric of society. In Joel Feinberg’s classification of laws
that restrict individual liberty, Shiffrin’s law that punishes pure lying
13 Shiffrin, Speech 164.
14 Shiffrin, Speech 118.
15 See e.g. Frederick Schauer, ‘Harm(s) and the First Amendment’ (2011) The Supreme Court Review
81.
16 Shiffrin, Speech 157.
17 Shiffrin, Speech 137.
18 Shiffrin, Speech 136.
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is a form of critical moralism, as it aims to enforce through state
coercion true moral norms of communication.19
The collective harm Shiffrin refers to as a justification for cen-
soring the liar is different from the type of collective harm that
advocates of hate-speech prohibition like Jeremy Waldron have re-
lied on.20 The argument in the latter case is that hate speech, even
when not directed against a particular person, targets groups whose
members share a specific characteristic like race, religion or sexual
orientation and aims to ‘besmirch the basics of their reputation’21
and assault their dignity in the sense of equal ‘social standing’.22 The
target may be a group, and therefore a collective element is present,
but the harm is personal. By contrast, in Shiffrin’s account it is the
‘basis’23 or ‘collective fabric’24 or ‘moral culture’25 of trust that is
allegedly damaged. This is a form of impersonal harm to an abstract
moral good.
To sum up: lying, in the sense of deliberately misrepresenting
one’s mental content to another, is a moral wrong regardless of the
intention of the speaker or the effect his lie has on other people’s
minds. It is also a legal wrong and the state can legitimately punish
liars because they harm the moral fabric of trust. This harm, al-
though non-specific and impersonal, is sufficient reason for the
exercise of state coercion.
III. LYING AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
What happens when Shiffrin’s theory meets constitutional doctrine
on freedom of speech? Her discussion of United States v Alvarez26 is
illuminating. The defendant, who was active in local government
politics, had falsely claimed during a district board meeting that he
was the recipient of the Congressional Medal of Honor and was
subsequently convicted of violating the Stolen Valor Act of 2005, a
federal statute that made it a criminal offence to falsely represent
19 Joel Feinberg, Harmless Wrongdoing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990) 124.
20 Jeremy Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2012).
21 Waldron, Hate Speech 5.
22 Waldron, Hate Speech 5.
23 Shiffrin, Speech 131.
24 Shiffrin, Speech 157.
25 Shiffrin, Speech 163.
26 United States v Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
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oneself to have received a decoration or award for distinguished
military service. The speaker’s aim in lying and the effect his lie had
on the audience were irrelevant for the issue of his criminal liability
as the Act did not require a showing that he intended to deceive or
that his listeners were actually deceived. It punished the telling of a
lie as such; the fact that the speaker had knowingly misrepresented
his mental content was enough to trigger his conviction.
The Supreme Court held that the Act violated the First Amend-
ment. It noted that while there were several instances where the
government could legitimately regulate false speech there was no
rule that such speech ‘should be in a general category that is pre-
sumptively unprotected’.27 The Act was proscribing speech on the
basis of its content in a ‘sweeping, quite unprecedented’28 way: it
covered all statements regardless of the place (public or private) or
the context (family, social or political) in which they were made and
ignored their purpose. The moment the lie was uttered the gov-
ernment could punish the liar without any additional requirements
whatsoever. In other words, the Act lacked ‘limiting features,’29
which could have functioned as safeguards against the risk of
excessive censorship. This concern about the Act’s overbroad reach
was exacerbated by the fact that it did not require the government to
show that there was a causal link between the conduct it criminalised
(lying about a medal or award) and the alleged harm it sought to
prevent (compromising the integrity and purpose of the award), nor
had the government been able to show that in this particular case the
defendant’s false claim had had such an effect.
Shiffrin thinks that we have good moral reasons to let the
defendant go unpunished. When we open ourselves to the word,
when we talk about our personal history including our achievements
and failures, there is always the temptation to present ourselves in a
better light than reality justifies. Whether we give in to the temp-
tation and how far we go in painting this favourable—and not en-
tirely accurate—picture will depend on the level of our emotional
integration and our ability to accept ourselves as we really are, but
no one is, in principle, immune to the occasional misrepresentation
which might earn one the others’ respect, admiration or acceptance.
27 Alvarez 2547.
28 Alvarez 2547.
29 Alvarez 2555.
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Moral imperfection is a feature of our shared humanity which jus-
tifies exercising forbearance towards pure autobiographical lies.
Shiffrin explains: ‘Where the motive of the wrongdoer reflects
weakness, insecurity or fear, rather than animus, manipulativeness,
or an objectionable insensitivity to particular people, demonstrating
acceptance and inclusiveness may be especially apt.’30
Those moral reasons justifying an accepting attitude towards the
liar are motivated by toleration-related and not speech-related con-
cerns. Shiffrin is scathing in her criticism of the reasoning in Alvarez,
which held that the Stolen Valor Act was incompatible with free-
speech principles. She concedes that the Act was a badly drafted
piece of legislation which imposed disproportionate penalties,
including imprisonment of up to a year, and gave rise to serious
worries about selective prosecution and self-censorship. She thinks,
though, that those are ‘contingent objections to the particular ver-
sion of legal regulation of lies embodied in the Stolen Valor Act and
to its criminalization.’31 A different, more moderate statute, using
civil rather than criminal penalties should have passed constitutional
muster because, in contrast to what the Supreme Court held, there
are no independent, speech-related reasons which could have ren-
dered it incompatible with the First Amendment.
Shiffrin identifies three such possible reasons, mentioned by the
Supreme Court in Alvarez, and rejects all of them. First, she claims
that the Act was not a clearly content-based restriction on speech
because it aimed to regulate not the content of the speech (i.e. the lie
as such) but ‘the conjunction of the speaker’s mental state toward
the content, namely that the speaker believes it to be false, and her
presentation of that content, nevertheless, as though it were true and
believed by her to be true.’32 Second, she denies that false statements
might have free-speech value as a contribution to the quest for truth
or an individual’s project of discovering her true self. Lastly, she
argues that there is no need to demonstrate the existence of a par-
ticularized harm caused by falsehoods in order to prohibit them and
punish liars. It is to this third claim that I turn to in the following
section.
30 Shiffrin, Speech 177.
31 Shiffrin, Speech 124.
32 Shiffrin, Speech 126.
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IV. THE VULNERABILITY OF TRUST
Shiffrin is able to reject the need for some sort of particularized
‘legally cognizable harm’33 before false speech is curtailed because
she has already stated that lying as such damages the moral fabric of
society in the form of undermining the force of testimonial warrants
and spoiling the presumption of sincerity. This is the empirical
argument which allows her to move from the normative claim that
the mere utterance of falsehoods is, in principle, morally wrong to
the conclusion that it should also constitute a legal wrong which the
government can punish.
The first objection to Shiffrin’s use of impersonal harm is that no
evidence is offered for the truth of her empirical claim. There seems
to be an assumption that the fabric of trust is so delicate that the
mere expression of insincere speech, even where no one is deceived
by it, is enough to tear it to pieces. Shiffrin could reply that she is not
claiming that individual instances of lying will do so, but that the
cumulative effect of repeated lying will have this effect by changing
the nature of expression through speech. This takes us back to her
explanation of the wrongness of lying: ‘the wrong of lying is that it
operates on a maxim that, if it were universalized and constituted a
public rule of permissible action, would deprive us of reliable access
to a crucial set of truths and a reliable way to sort the true from the
false.’34 The word ‘universalized’ is important here: if testimony
were to be generally treated as a medium for conveying both truth
and falsehood it would be impossible for speech to perform its
function of distinguishing between the two. Therefore, the fabric of
trust, which is constructed by the revelation of our genuine mental
content to others, is particularly vulnerable to lying, which subverts
the assumption that the revelation is sincere.
Shiffrin relies on her empirical claim that pure lying destroys the
moral culture of sincerity to justify state coercion. While her worry
is understandable, we should be more careful before granting the
authorities the power to punish the mere utterance of insincerity.
We should ask for some more convincing evidence than the invo-
cation of some vague damage to an also rather vague moral fabric of
trust. This is not to deny the moral function of testimony and the
33 Shiffrin, Speech 157.
34 Shiffrin, Speech 23.
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importance of truthful speech. But it is one thing to recognise its
importance; it is quite another to use it as a justification for the
government’s sweeping power to punish, as the Supreme Court said
in Alvarez, ‘falsity and nothing more.’35 A possible objection is that
Shiffrin is making not an empirical but a deontological argument
about the duty of sincerity in testimony. While this is true, it does
not follow that evidence about the alleged harm is unnecessary. The
claim underlying her account concerns the effect of lying, has an
empirical dimension and calls for an evidentiary explanation of how
lying spoils speech.
Besides, Shiffrin herself expects the production of specific empir-
ical evidence in the context of deontological debates on free speech.
She notes that opposition to the regulation of speech on the ground
that it might lead to self-censorship—the ‘chilling effect’ argu-
ment—is often formulated in too casual a manner.36 She acknowl-
edges that self-censorship is a serious and real issue but asks for a
‘stronger evidentiary basis’ of how governmental regulation stifles
free expression.37 Those who rely on the chilling effect are, like
Shiffrin, also making a normative argument about the conditions of
communication, but she doesn’t find this sufficient to absolve them
of the obligation to supply evidence for their normative claims. And
she is right not to take the proponents of the argument from self-
censorship on their word. But like Shiffrin, who looks for ‘more
precision and data about the chilling effect’,38 we should also look for
the same strong evidentiary basis, precision and data about the harm
the mere expression of a lie inflicts on the culture of trust. If evidence
is required of those who are concerned about the harm caused to
speech, the same requirement should apply to those concerned
about harm caused by speech.
Further, Shiffrin concedes that lying is an unavoidable feature of
living with others in society: there are, she says, ‘commonplace
opportunities and temptations to lie in everyday life’.39 Perhaps this
is too mild a description—it seems to me that in our relations with
others, we lie, in the sense of not revealing our genuine mental
35 Alvarez at 2545.
36 Shiffrin, Speech 123 fn. 17. Shiffrin refers here to the analysis of chilling effect arguments in Leslie
Kendrick, Speech, Intent and the Chilling Effect 54 William and Mary L. Rev. 1633 (2013).
37 Shiffrin, Speech 123 fn. 17.
38 Shiffrin, Speech 123 fn. 17.
39 Shiffrin, Speech 177.
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content, and we are being lied to, all the time. In any case, it would
be morally wrong and practically impossible to hold speakers liable
whenever they are insincere, nor does Shiffrin so believe. Her ac-
count provides for situations where the moral obligation to reveal
one’s true mental content does not apply. She calls them ‘suspended
contexts’: ‘here, the normative presumption of truthfulness is sus-
pended because these contexts serve other valuable purposes whose
achievement depends upon the presumption’s suspension and the
fact and justification of the suspension are publicly available.’40
When speaking within a suspended context ‘the speaker’s (potential)
insincerity is reasonable and justifiable.’41 She emphasises that this is
a normative notion based on morally relevant reasons which are
accessible to everyone. Put differently, a suspended context arises if
and only if there is no normative expectation to be sincere. False
statements made in a suspended context, she says, are not, properly
speaking, lies.42 It follows that they are not morally wrong in the
way lies are, and should be beyond the reach of the law.
We have already seen that Shiffrin thinks that false autobio-
graphical statements are an example of falsehoods that should be
tolerated. In the same category we find false statements which are
necessary to protect another person’s legitimate interests (the
‘murderer at the door’ example);43 those necessary for the speaker’s
privacy protection, self-protection and defence;44 responses to re-
quests for information requiring a ‘yes or no’ answer without leaving
room for clarifications;45 and statements made in the context of
social etiquette.46 All these are falsehoods which are not, in a morally
relevant sense, lies because they are expressed in circumstances
which give rise to a suspended context where the obligation of
sincerity does not obtain. Thus suspended contexts mitigate the
harshness of the thesis that the law should punish pure lying and
place a considerable amount of false speech beyond the reach of the
government.
40 Shiffrin, Speech 16.
41 Shiffrin, Speech 16.
42 Shiffrin, Speech 18. A different terminology would be to describe them as justified lies.
43 Shiffrin, Speech 26 et seq.
44 Shiffrin, Speech 149.
45 Shiffrin, Speech 150-151.
46 Shiffrin, Speech 153.
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While this approach makes very good sense, it is not easy to
reconcile with Shiffrin’s earlier claim that the fabric of trust can be
destroyed by the mere utterance of falsehoods. Those suspended
contexts, taken together, cover a very large part of our social lives
and our relations with others. It would seem, therefore, that toler-
ating falsehood to such an extent would cause irreparable damage to
the culture necessary to sustain sincere testimony. Shiffrin allows for
too much lying: if sincerity is as vulnerable as she thinks it is, the
combined effect of the suspended contexts would be to blur the
distinction between lying and sincerity and create the impression
that lies are a generally acceptable way of communicating with
others.
I don’t think it is convincing to reply that no harm to the culture
of sincerity is caused because, in suspended contexts, there is no
normative presumption of sincerity. Our emotional reaction and
personal attitude to lying does not depend (or not entirely) on a
Kantian calculation of the moral duties flowing from that pre-
sumption. My understanding of Shiffrin’s position is that she is
interested in the effect the utterance of falsehoods has not only on
the norms associated with trust but also on the people involved in
lying. Thus she accuses Justice Breyer of showing ‘shocking insen-
sitivity’47 when he says in Alvarez that ‘…in family, social or other
private contexts… lies will often cause little harm’;48 falsehood, she
retorts, can ‘wreak special damage’49 on important personal and
family relationships. This damage appears to be different from the
harm caused on the impersonal communication warrants described
earlier in the book; it is a more immediate, personal form of harm
linked to the emotional experience of being lied to. In other words,
personal attitudes towards sincerity and falsehood are also shaped by
factors that transcend the normative element of human life; they will
depend not only on the requirements of morality but also on a
variety of emotions stirred up by the encounter with truth and lies. It
appears, therefore, that whether lying causes harm cannot be an-
swered by looking exclusively at whether the normative conditions
for a suspended context obtain.
47 Shiffrin Speech 136
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
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Perhaps the answer is that the fabric of trust is much more re-
silient than Shiffrin thinks. Despite the fact that we come in contact
with falsehood, both as originators and recipients of it, on a daily
basis, we don’t despair of engaging in meaningful relations in our
personal, social and professional lives, nor do we think that speech
has lost its role as a means for expressing genuine mental content.
Without closing our eyes to our and others’ moral imperfections, so
sensitively described by Shiffrin, we still find it possible to establish
authentic connections. We learn to recognise indications of sincerity
and build our own emotional and mental capacity to be sincere, and
we develop our moral agency and a sense for morality’s require-
ments. It is possible that when we find ourselves on the receiving
end of insincerity, when our trust is betrayed and we realise that the
other person has deliberately misled us, we feel that the possibility
itself of sincere communication has been shattered to pieces. But if
we are fortunate enough to have experienced sincerity in other
relations, the pain and anxiety caused by particular instances of lying
are mitigated and we are gradually able to regain our trust to speech
as a medium for authenticity.
Moreover, unless we are entirely blind to our faults, we are able
to recall our own lying and see ourselves not as the perpetual victims
of false speech but also as the occasional perpetrators. A realisation
that the same person can be, at different times, both a sincere
speaker and a liar can also help us accept that testimony, as a
medium, can convey both truth and falsehood, without the latter
spoiling the former. By this I do not mean to downplay the differ-
ence between the two or suggest that they should merge into one.
Rather, the condition I am describing is one of co-existence, not
fusion. My suggestion is that when a view of speech as wholly ‘pure’
and exclusively dedicated to the expression of truth is replaced by the
understanding that truth and falsehood are both parts of our col-
lective communication framework, a more accurate and realistic
picture of the function of speech develops and our trust in it is
enhanced, not diminished.
I think that most people are able to mentally and morally contain,
at the same time, two distinct realities: on the one hand, the many
instances of lying in every aspect of human life; on the other, the
need for authenticity in expressing one’s mind and encountering the
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mind of others. This makes it possible to tolerate the frustration
caused by lying and supports the conditions of truthful communi-
cation and the function of speech as a link between minds. If this
sounds true, then Shiffrin’s claim about the vulnerability of sincerity
is less convincing.
V. THE CAUSAL INQUIRY
Even if Shiffrin’s empirical claim is correct and there exists a moral
fabric of trust delicate enough to be irreparably damaged by pure
lying, the case for legally curtailing pure lies has not yet been made
as not all harms caused by speech can legitimise the exercise of state
coercion. It is necessary to ask if this impersonal harm is morally
relevant in the sense that it can justify the censorship of false
statements and the punishment of the speaker. As mentioned earlier,
Shiffrin thinks it is. Recall that in her theory the evil that state
coercion is meant to address is the destruction of the part of society’s
moral code which underpins the ‘moral culture’50 or ‘collective
fabric’51 or ‘basis’52 of trust. She claims that this is enough because
what is needed to legitimise the punishment of the liar is not par-
ticularised harm but some form of harm:
‘The point of demanding a showing of harm is to ensure that speech is not regulated merely
because many find it distasteful or to ensure that the regulation pursues a legally appropriate
interest and does not regulate immoral behaviour as such. These are legitimate aims, but they
do not entail a requirement of particularized harm. These constraints are satisfied if the moti-
vation for regulation is to preserve the scheme of reliable communication or to adopt a public
stance that reliability is a communal good.’53
Thus the justificatory function we expect harm to perform is
accomplished by the potential impersonal harm caused to society’s
morality.
This position entails two claims: first, that impersonal harm to
abstract moral goods is a reason legitimatising state coercion; second,
that there is no need for the government to show that there is a
causal link between the measure it takes (i.e. punishing pure lies) and
the damage it allegedly seeks to prevent (i.e. the destruction of the
moral fabric of sincerity). While there are objections to the first
50 Shiffrin, Speech 163.
51 Shiffrin, Speech 157.
52 Shiffrin, Speech 131.
53 Shiffrin, Speech 138 (emphasis in the original).
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claim, I will focus on the second claim because it is particularly
relevant for constitutional doctrine on free speech.
The issue of causation came up in Alvarez. The U.S. government
conceded that ‘an isolated misrepresentation by itself would not
tarnish the meaning of military honors’ but asserted that ‘it is
common sense that false representations have the tendency to dilute
the value and meaning of military awards.’54 Put in Shiffrin’s terms,
the government was saying that the function of military awards was
to establish a system of testimonial warrants: an award or medal
communicates to the world that the recipient served with great
distinction and bravery, and this communication works only if we
can be certain that its content is true. We respect the recipient
because we trust that the message conveyed by the award is accu-
rate. Repeated false claims by impostors, if left unpunished, will
diminish the reliability of the awards system and, therefore, its
function as a medium for recognising truly distinguished service will
be compromised. If it becomes generally accepted that a military
award might not constitute reliable testimony, the fabric of trust
underpinning the awards system is damaged and, therefore, the
meaning of awards is spoiled.
The Supreme Court was rightly not persuaded. Justice Kennedy
noted that the Constitution requires the government to show that
there is a link between lying about the award and the potential harm
to the military awards system before it is allowed to limit the liberty
to speak, and found that beyond its assertion that the meaning of the
awards will be diluted, it had failed to provide any evidence that such
a causal link existed. Shiffrin’s criticism is that he shouldn’t have
asked for it at all, as the damage to the ‘collective testimonial
framework’55 underpinning military awards and the possibility that
we might come to doubt the validity of the message conveyed by the
awards are enough to justify state coercion.
Shiffrin does not pay enough attention to the importance of the
causal inquiry in constitutional adjudication in general, and free
speech cases in particular. In American constitutional law, the dan-
gers of doing away with a causation test are exemplified in the three
54 Alvarez at 2549 (internal quotation marks omitted).
55 Shiffrin, Speech 136.
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infamous First World War speech cases: Schenck,56Frohwerk57 and
Debs.58 All three concerned convictions under the Espionage Act
1917 which had criminalised conduct likely to interfere with the war
effort by causing insubordination in the armed forces or interfering
with recruitment. Schenck was about the distribution of anti-war
leaflets criticising the draft and encouraging people to oppose it,
while Frohwerk involved a series of newspaper articles which argued
that the war served capitalist interests and that those who refused to
fight could not be blamed. The Supreme Court, in opinions written
by Justice Holmes, upheld the convictions. In Schenck he stated that
the test was whether there was a ‘clear and present danger’ that the
speech in question could cause the harm the government was trying
to prevent and that this was a matter of ‘proximity and degree’.
Although there was no evidence whatsoever that the leaflets had had
any effect on the war effort he held that proximity was satisfied
because they had the ‘tendency’59 to do so.
Justice Holmes applied the same test to the articles at stake in
Frohwerk and, again, held that the lack of any nexus between them
and the alleged harm was not an issue because they could cause
future harms by affecting the attitude of people towards the war: ‘[I]t
is impossible to say that it might not have been found that the
circulation of the paper was in quarters where a little breath would
be enough to kindle a flame and that the fact was known and relied
upon by those who sent the paper out.’60Debs was even more
problematic as it involved speech at a political forum par excellence.
The defendant, the presidential candidate of the Socialist Party, had
spoken at the party conference criticising world capitalism and the
war and praising his comrades who had been convicted of aiding and
abetting others in not registering for the draft. For the third time,
Justice Holmes held that Debs’s speech did not enjoy First Amend-
ment protection because it had the ‘natural tendency’61 negatively to
affect societal attitudes to the draft and the war.
56 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
57 Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
58 Debs v. United States, 39 S. Ct. 252 (1919).
59 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
60 Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 209 (1919).
61 Debs v. United States, 39 S. Ct. 252, 254 (1919).
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In all three cases the causation test applied is extremely lax: a
possible tendency of speech to affect the way citizens viewed the war
was enough to satisfy it. It was this lack of a serious causal inquiry
which deprived the clear and present danger test of any bite and
turned it into a mechanism of wholesale deference to the government.
The fact that the speech in question was clearly political in nature, did
not constitute incitement to violence and concerned a matter of the
utmost public interest was not enough to protect those whose views
were inconvenient for the government. Accepting that the possibility
of harm to a societal value (like bravery at war or commitment to
sincerity) can legitimise censorship without any showing of a link
between speech and harm amounts to granting the state practically
unlimited power to curtail speech. The Supreme Court acknowledged
this danger in Brandenburg v. Ohio which overruled Justice Holmes’s
test and held that the government must tolerate even the advocacy of
law violation ‘except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action. [The] mere abstract teaching of the moral propriety or
even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the same
as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action’.62
More recently, a strategy similar to that of Justice Holmes in
relation to causation has been used by the European Court of Hu-
man Rights in cases concerning speech which offends public
morality. Muller and others v. Switzerland63 was about the confiscation
by the Swiss authorities of the applicant’s paintings depicting sexual
scenes and his conviction for publishing obscene material. The
paintings were on show at an art space where the public was given
access free of charge. The court upheld the confiscation and con-
viction against a challenge based on the right to freedom of
expression under article 10 of the European Convention on Human
Rights.64 The government argued that the paintings were harmful
62 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969).
63 (1991) 13 EHRR 212.
64 Article 10: 1. ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to
hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority
and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of
broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it
duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security,
territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health
or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.’
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for public morality65 and the domestic courts agreed stating: ‘any
item is obscene which offends, in a manner that is difficult to accept,
the sense of sexual propriety’66 and ‘these are not works which, in
treating a particular subject or scene, allude to sexual activity more
or less discreetly. They place it in the foreground, depicting it not in
the embrace of man and woman but in vulgar images of sodomy,
fellatio between males, bestiality, erect penises and masturbation.
Sexual activity is the main, not to say sole, ingredient of all three
paintings … .’67
The European court held not only that the moralistic preferences
of the majority were a morally sufficient reason for censorship but
also allowed the confiscation and conviction to pass muster without
evidence of a causal link between speech and the alleged harm to the
fabric of sexual morality. The applicant argued that his paintings did
not cause public morals to deteriorate as there was no public outcry,
the press had supported his right to exhibit his art and he had been
able to do so both before and after the exhibition at stake in the case.
Yet, the court did not discuss the argument, pointing instead to the
judgments of the domestic courts which had found that the
provocative nature of the paintings was ‘liable to offend the sense of
sexual propriety’68 and that this was enough to justify governmental
action.
A possible reply is that those are instances of content-based
restrictions of speech. The government was censoring a communi-
cation because it disagreed with the message it conveyed, whereas
the regulation of lies, Shiffrin has argued, is content-neutral. How-
ever, even if this is true, it does not follow that the causal inquiry can
be ignored. Shiffrin takes the view that the regulation of lies is
analogous to the so called ‘time, place and manner’ restrictions on
speech,69 typical examples of which are regulations for noise control,
traffic control and the use of public property. But, while it is true that
the Supreme Court applies to those restrictions a more deferential
65 The government also invoked the ‘rights of others’ as a reason justifying the confiscation because
a father had taken his daughter to the gallery and she had ‘reacted violently’ upon seeing the painting.
The court was clear that the government’s aim was the protection of morality: ‘The applicants’
conviction … was intended to protect morals.’ (paragraph 35).
66 Muller, paragraph 18.
67 Muller, paragraph 16.
68 Muller, paragraph 18.
69 Shiffrin, Speech 126.
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standard of review than the usual strict scrutiny test applied to
content-based measures, it also requires the government to
demonstrate that the harms it seeks to avoid by curtailing speech are
real and that the limitations are narrowly drawn to serve an
important state interest.70 Put differently, the fact that a restriction
hinges on the time, place and manner of the communication, as
opposed to its content, is not enough to save it if the government
cannot provide evidence that there is an empirically justifiable match
between its action and the aim it pursues. Even if the Stolen Valor
Act were a content-neutral statute, similar to a time, place and
manner regulation, the Supreme Court would still be justified in
asking the government to show that there was a link between lying
about a military award and the alleged damage to the military
awards system.71
I am not saying that Shiffrin would agree with the outcome of the
cases discussed earlier, or that her theory inevitably leads to such
results or that she would endorse majoritatian moralism. Rather, my
concern is that she underestimates the importance of the causal
inquiry in constitutional adjudication. Expecting the state to satisfy a
rigorous causation test is an important safeguard for civil liberties,
and the history of free speech jurisprudence shows that it performs
an essential role as a limit to governmental zeal to regulate what can
and cannot be said. From the point of view of constitutional adju-
dication in freedom of expression cases, her approach is very close to
the ‘clear and present danger’ test and difficult to reconcile with the
Brandenburg standard, which rejects abstract threats to societal
interests as a legitimate basis for censorship. If Shiffrin’s account,
philosophically compelling and elegant as it is, were to become a
70 See e.g. US v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288
(1984); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
71 The Supreme Court explored further the issue of punishment for false statements in Maslenjak v
United States 137 S.Ct. 1918 (2017). The claimant, a refugee from former Yugoslavia, had been given
asylum in the United States and was subsequently naturalised as a U.S. citizen. When it emerged that
she had lied about the participation of her husband in the civil war, she lost her citizenship and was
deported under a federal provision which made it a crime to procure naturalisation ‘contrary to law’.
The government’s argument was that since she had lied during the naturalisation proceedings she had
broken another law which criminalises the making of a false statement under oath in such proceedings.
In an opinion by Justice Kagan, the Court held that making a false statement as such was not enough for
a conviction; the government also needs to demonstrate that the lies had a material effect in the
acquisition of citizenship. While the case was not decided on free speech grounds, it is relevant for the
issue of causation discussed here. Following a similar approach as in Alvarez, the Court required
evidence of a causal link between lying and obtaining citizenship, refusing to uphold punishment for
falsity which does not actually deceive.
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standard of adjudication, the protection for speech would signifi-
cantly deteriorate.
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